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Faculty compensation is a serious matter.  Rewards for performance are an expectation.  
Managers recognize that rewards often drive performance and productivity.  Faculty members 
who perform well expect to be rewarded well.  Faculty members expend considerable time and 
effort developing evaluation instruments and procedures for assessing and rewarding peer 
performance.  Depending on how the reward process is implemented faculty performance rewards 
may not result as expected.  This paper contrasts faculty compensation models including one that 
produces a high performance, low compensation anomaly for higher paid faculty. 
 





niversity faculty members usually are aware of the compensation/performance practices and 
expectations of their employers.  Faculty members who perform well generally expect to be rewarded 
well.  Similarly, faculty members who perform poorly may recognize that their performance may not 
result in an improved compensation level.  Feedback on performance can and does impact resulting performance 
levels.   
 
Performance-related feedback has been described as a primary mechanism for enhancing both individual 
performance and motivation (Ilgen, Fisher and Taylor 1979).  Feedback can be used to motivate employee efforts to 
organizational success (Larson, 1984).  Bannister (1986) also found that feedback was a useful tool for motivating 
performance when it provides employees with information that is important to accomplishing their own goals.  As 
feedback is an important component in for-profit businesses, it is important in academic settings as well. 
 
Several researchers (Bennett 1985, Bennett and Chater 1984, Reisman 1986) emphasize the importance of 
feedback in academic settings.  Performance feedback from academic administrators has been assumed to motivate 
faculty to achieve higher levels of performance (Bennett 1985).  However, results reported by Landy, Barnes and 
Murphy (1978) and Greenberg (1986) indicate the supervisor’s knowledge of the subordinate’s performance was 
related to perceptions of fairness and accuracy of the performance appraisal.  Ilgen et. al (1981) find trust in one’s 
supervisor is related to favorable perceptions of the appraisal atmosphere and helpfulness of the feedback.  
Similarly, Fulk, Brief and Barr (1985) note that trust in one’s supervisor was related to perceptions of fairness and 
accuracy of the performance appraisal.  Still, pay for performance is usually expected.  Mathis and Jackson (2006, p. 
374) proffer that people in organizations work in order to gain rewards for their efforts and the extent to which they 
feel they have been fairly compensated affects their performance. 
 
Daft (2005, p. 454) notes that pay for performance aligns behaviors needed to help the organization achieve 
it strategic goals and provides employees incentives to make the firm more efficient.  Williams (2007, p. 376) 
encourages companies to analyze employee turnover to determine whether good or poor performers are choosing to 
leave the company.  Goodson, Duarte and Budden (1995) note that perceptions of supervisor credibility can 
demotivate faculty members.  If good performers are leaving and poor performers are staying, compensation may be 
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part of the culprit.  Williams (2007) mentions that poor performers are more likely to stay when they are paid large, 
guaranteed salaries.  The thought of poor performers staying does not sit well with many. 
 
The question as to appropriate compensation is critical.  As faculty members are well aware, compensation 
serves as a main attractant to a position.  Lussier (2006, p. 284) mentions that compensation serves to attract and 
retain employees.  Similarly, Bateman and Snell (2009, p. 378) mention that reward systems can serve the purpose 
of attracting, motivating and retaining people.  George and Jones (2005, p. 90) mention that high job satisfaction 
leads to lower employee turnover.  So, where does this leave faculty? 
 
Faculty members have long recognized that there is difficulty in providing assessment instruments for their 
activities.  Discussions abound about how to measure teaching effectiveness.  Questions arise as to how to value 





 Assume a department exists that has only four faculty members.  The four faculty members’ performances 
are assessed annually.  They have different ranks, were hired at different times, and have different salaries as 
indicated.  Still, there is one merit instrument for evaluating performance.  That instrument is a rating scale that 
provides a point total (from 0 to 100 points).  Thus each of the faculty and their annual evaluations are shown in 
Table 1.  Note, the instrument allows up to 10 “bonus” points to be earned for exemplary accomplishments, thus a 





Faculty Member Annual Salary $ Annual Evaluation Points University Set-Aside $ (7.5%) 
1 100,000 110 7,500 
2 85,000 100 6,375 
3 70,000 80 5,250 
4 50,000 70 3,750 
Total   22,875 
 
 
The University provides the department with a 7.5% fund to distribute merit-based raises.  The distribution 
of the funds is not mandated explicitly, but it is expected that performance will be rewarded in an equitable manner. 
 
One method for dividing the funds is to divide each individual’s point total by the department’s total annual 
points earned to derive a weighting scale that would then be used to distribute the funds.  Table 2 indicates such a 
point weighting scale.  Note that this results in an equal dollar value per assessment point.  In other words, all 





Faculty Member Total Points / Individual 
Points 
Percentage of total points 
earned 
Column 3 x University Set-
aside 
1 110 / 360 30.55 6,989 
2 100 / 360 27.77 6,354 
3 80 / 360 22.22 5,083 
4 70 / 360 19.44 4,448 
   22,874 (rounding) 
 
 
Thus, faculty raise percentages would appear as follows: 
 




Faculty Member (salary) $ Pay raise % Increase 
1 ($100,000) 6,989 6.98 
2 ($85,000) 6,354 7.47 
3 ($70,000) 5,083 7.26 
4 ($50,000) 4,448 8.89 
 
 
Thus, the faculty member with the lowest annual performance evaluation receives the highest percentage 
increase in pay of 8.89 percent.  That is well above the University’s set aside fund of 7.5 percent.  Indeed, the 
highest performing faculty member with a 110% assessment receives less than the average increase; earning only a 
6.98 percent raise.  The fact that the best performing faculty member receives the lowest percentage raise while the 
lowest performing faculty member receives the largest percentage raise is an anomaly of the process.  It is noted that 
such an anomaly rewards faculty member #1 with a larger dollar raise than the others while providing a lower 
percentage raise.  Indeed, one may interpret Table 3’s third column as indicating that only one faculty member 
exceeded the average raise set aside of 7.5%, and that faculty member’s actual performance assessment was the 
lowest of the four. 
 
If the University were to require a flat, across-the-board raise of a certain amount, then the anomaly 
becomes more pronounced.  For example, if the University mandates an across the board distribution of $400 per 













$ Across the 
Board 
Column 3 x University Set-aside 
of $21,275 ($22,875 less $1600 
across the board distribution) 
Final $ Raise 
(%) 
 
1 110 / 360 30.56 400 6,499 6,899 (6.89%) 
2 100 / 360 27.77 400 5,908 6,308 (7.42%) 
3 80 / 360 22.22 400 4,727 5,127 (7.32%) 
4 70 / 360 19.44 400 4,135 4,535 (9.07%) 
   1,600 21,269 (rounding)  
 
 
The result of mandating an across-the-board raise of a fixed amount ($400 in this example) before the 
distribution of merit funds exacerbates the anomaly in the sense that the lowest performing faculty member actually 
increases their raise. Conversely, the highest performing faculty member’s raise falls from 6.98 percent to 6.89 
percent.  Again, it should be pointed out that the dollar raise is highest for the highest paid faculty member, but the 
percentage increase lags.  Indeed, one may interpret the less than average raise of faculty member #1 as an 
indication that the faculty member is not performing at an adequate level of performance (less than average) – which 
would be in error. 
 
 It is interesting to note that a potential interpretation of the anomaly’s impact is that it is better to have two 
lower paid faculty members with less than maximum ratings than one higher paid faculty with a stellar rating, if the 
goal of the unit is to increase overall productivity alone.  In other words, two $50,000 salaried faculty members each 
receiving a 70 on the rating scale, ostensibly would produce more output than one $100,000 faculty member with a 
rating of 110. 
 
An interesting twist on the pay raise anomaly occurs if merit points were reversed for the four faculty 
members.  If the lowest paid faculty member were to receive the best merit evaluation, and the highest paid faculty 
member were to receive the lowest merit score, the results appear incongruous.  If no across the board raise is 
implemented, then Table 5 displays the results of such an incongruity. 
 
 









$ Raise based on 
Merit Weight 
$ per Merit Point Raise 
Percentage 
 
1 70 / 360 19.44 $4,447 63.54 4.45% 
2 80 / 360 22.22 $5,083 63.54 5.98% 
3 100 / 360 27.78 $6,354 63.54 9.08% 
4 110 / 360 30.56 $6,989 63.54 13.98% 
 
 
As can be seen in Table 5, the anomaly results in the lowest paid faculty member increasing his/her take 
(now 13.98%), while the highest paid faculty member decreases his/her take, both in dollars and as a percentage. 
 
The distribution of funds in this case is not the only method of distributing pay raise monies.  In a 
convenience sampling of five administrators at 3 different universities, most differed in their calculation of raises 
given the basic information in Table 1.  It is just this difference that creates much discussion in higher education 
circles as to how to assess and reward faculty performance. 
 
One method of reducing or eliminating the anomaly involves weighting both the merit points and the 
salaries.  Such a weighting creates a situation whereby the person with the highest merit evaluation and highest 










$ Raise based on 
Merit Weight 
$ per Merit Point Total Raise 
Percent 
 
1 110 / 360 19.44 $8,798 79.98 8.80% 
2 100 / 360 22.22 $6,799 67.99 8.00% 
3 80 / 360 27.78 $4,479 55.99 6.40% 
4 70 / 360 30.56 $2,799 39.99 5.60% 





By using a method that weights both salary and merit points the anomaly does not occur.  What some 
would expect - a higher salary and a higher merit assessment results in a higher raise and raise percentage – actually 
occurs.  A lower performance assessment results in lower percentage raise and a lower dollar increase.  However, 




 Rewarding faculty for their performance is always a touchy subject.  The fact that much of what faculty 
members do is difficult to assess creates much discussion in academic circles.  The occurrence of a compensation 
anomaly in some pay raise processes creates room for dissension among faculty ranks.  Both methods discussed 
have their attractive points and their detriments. 
 
 In the method that creates the anomaly, all merit points have an equal value.  One may argue that since 
faculty have the same performance expectations that all performance points be valued equally.  On the other hand, 
one may argue that a person who has performed better should be rewarded in such a manner that recognizes 
differences in salary, and in the contribution that results from salary differences to the overall pay raise fund.  The 
differences that result from various methods of weighting will continue to generate discussions in faculty circles. 
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